Just a Shadow? The Role of Radical Right Parties in the Politicization of Immigration, 1995–2009 by Meyer, Sarah & Rosenberger, Sieglinde
 Politics and Governance, 2015, Volume 3, Issue 2, Pages 1-17 1 
Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183-2463) 




Just a Shadow? The Role of Radical Right Parties in the Politicization of 
Immigration, 1995–2009 
Sarah Meyer * and Sieglinde Rosenberger 
Department of Political Science, University of Vienna, 1010 Vienna, Austria; E-Mails: sarah.meyer@univie.ac.at (S.M.), 
sieglinde.rosenberger@univie.ac.at (S.R.) 
* Corresponding author 
Submitted: 13 May 2014 | In Revised Form: 11 November 2014 | Accepted: 8 January 2015 |  
Published: 28 April 2015 
Abstract 
The paper explores the role of radical right parties in the politicization of immigration. In scholarly literature, radical 
right parties are viewed as the owners of the immigration issue and as drivers of its politicization. Against this prevalent 
view, we argue that the significance of radical right parties in politicizing immigration is overrated: (1) Radical right par-
ties only play a subordinate role in the politicization of immigration, whereas the contribution of mainstream parties to 
raising issue salience has been underestimated; (2) the politicization of immigration is not related to radical right 
strength in the party system. The findings are based on media data from a comparative project on public claims-making 
on immigration in Western European countries (SOM, Support and Opposition to Migration). We discuss our findings in 
comparison to the relevant literature and suggest avenues for further research. 
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1. Introduction 
Populist, radical, and extreme right-wing parties have 
established themselves as serious political competitors 
in Western European politics in the last few decades. 
Some of them experienced electoral triumphs, such as 
the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) in the 2002 elections in the 
Netherlands, the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), which be-
came the strongest party in 1999, or the Austrian Free-
dom Party (FPÖ) winning 27 per cent in the 1999 elec-
tions and becoming part of a coalition government as a 
result, which was widely interpreted as the crossing of 
a border-line (cf., Minkenberg, 2001). Meanwhile, vari-
ous parties from the populist or radical right camp, like 
the LPF (2002) and Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom 
(PVV) (2010) in the Netherlands, also succeeded in of-
fice-seeking. Despite different terminology—like popu-
list, new populist, radical or extreme right-wing par-
ties—all of these parties share an anti-immigrant 
stance embedded in a nationalist or even xenophobic 
ideology that has often been accompanied by a strong 
anti-Islamic rhetoric in recent years. In line with 
Minkenberg (2008), Norris (2005), Kitschelt (1995) and 
others, we will refer to them as radical right parties in 
the following.1 
Academic work suggests that the success of these 
parties has had a lasting impact on the political land-
scape in Western Europe. First, some scholars find evi-
                                                          
1 This, however, does not imply that there are not any differ-
ences between these labels (cf., Carter, 2005, pp. 20-24 for a 
good overview of scholarly dispute on this). 
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dence of an impact the electoral success of the radical 
right has on people’s attitudes towards immigration 
(cf., Semyonov, Raijman, & Gorodzeisky, 2006; Spra-
gue-Jones, 2011). Second, the experience of electoral 
pressure of the radical right prompts other parties to 
adapt their policy programs and mobilization strate-
gies: the center-right by adopting a strategy of conver-
gence, whereas the center-left uses convergence and 
divergence strategies (Meguid, 2005) (cf., van Spanje, 
2010; Alonso & Fonseca, 2012). Third, there is substan-
tial evidence for a tightening of immigration policies 
(cf., Givens & Luedtke, 2005). Some scholars view this 
as a consequence of the radical right parties’ participa-
tion in governing coalitions or as mainstream governing 
parties’ response to the former’s electoral success (cf., 
Minkenberg, 2001; Schain, 2006). These observations, 
finally, cause both academics and political commenta-
tors to claim an overall swing to the right (Rechtsruck, 
Verrechtsing) in European democracies (cf., Westin, 
2003). 
Though labelling them single-issue parties would be 
an inadequate evaluation of the radical-right party 
family (cf., Mudde, 1999), the immigration issue cer-
tainly features prominently in their profile and cam-
paigning. As a consequence, radical right parties are 
viewed as the “owners” of the immigration issue in the 
party political landscape (cf., Ivarsflaten, 2008; Mudde, 
1999; van Spanje & van der Brug, 2007). The success of 
the radical right thus seems paralleled by the rise of 
topics related to immigration, migrant integration and 
asylum that have become contentious issues all over 
Europe. 
Following a top-down perspective of issue-
politicization, political actors are considered deter-
mined to put an issue on the political agenda, framing 
the public debate, and influencing people’s prefer-
ences and priorities (cf., Carmines & Stimson, 1986, 
1989; Hooghe & Marks, 2009). There is hardly any em-
pirical evidence on party-politicization of the immigra-
tion issue in the public arena: Whilst numerous studies 
deal with party platforms and campaigning efforts (cf., 
Gruber, 2014; van Heerden, de Lange, van der Brug, & 
Fennema, 2014), the extent to which immigration be-
comes part of political contestation in every-day mass 
communication has been widely neglected. Nonethe-
less, taking the above cited literature on influence and 
issue-ownership into account, radical right parties are 
supposed to play a key role in the politicization of im-
migration in public discourse (cf., Hagelund, 2003; 
Meguid, 2005; Minkenberg, 2002; Norris, 2005; Schain, 
2006; van Spanje, 2010).  
The paper at hand puts this prevalent view to the 
test, addressing a straightforward and simple research 
question: Do radical right parties dominate the politici-
zation of immigration in public discourse? The study is 
based on findings from the FP7 project SOM (Support 
and Opposition to Migration)2 that compared claims-
making on immigration in the media of several West-
ern European countries between 1995 and 2009. Our 
research includes cases with a strong radical right party 
presence during the whole period (Austria, Switzer-
land), with radical right parties that have been success-
ful at least for some periods (Belgium, the Nether-
lands), and countries with no such parties represented 
in national parliament (Spain, the United Kingdom). As 
the objective of this paper is not to test explanations 
for the politicization of immigration, but to explore the 
role of radical right parties, we mainly present detailed 
descriptive findings and discuss them within the con-
text of the alleged significance of radical right parties 
claimed in scholarly literature.  
Based on our data, we put forward two arguments: 
(1) Radical right parties only play a subordinate role in 
the politicization of immigration in the mass media, 
whereas the contribution of mainstream parties to rais-
ing issue salience has been underestimated; (2) issue-
politicization on immigration is not related to radical 
right strength in the party system. While our findings 
contradict the alleged significance of populist, radical 
and extreme right parties discussed in the relevant lit-
erature, they support recent contributions by scholars 
discomforted by the lack of systematic comparative 
analyses and claiming that the impact of these parties 
on contemporary politics is clearly overestimated (cf., 
Akkerman, 2012; Alonso & Fonseca, 2012; Mudde, 
2013). 
2. Radical Right Parties and the Politicization of 
Immigration 
Processes of issue-politicization have traditionally been 
at the centre of interest in political science (Carmines & 
Stimson, 1989, 1986; Schattschneider, 1975). Broadly 
speaking, issue-politicization refers to the process 
whereby a topic becomes relevant for public debate 
and political contestation. De Wilde (2011, pp. 566-
567) names three stages of that process: a polarization 
of opinions (i.e., some sort of conflict), intensified pub-
lic debate, and public resonance. When issues are 
deemed politically relevant by the general public and 
hence become politicized, this might also result in an 
increase of their electoral importance. Consequently, 
while processes of issue-politicization can involve dif-
ferent societal actors, political parties and their strate-
gies are key actors in this respect (cf., de Wilde, 2011; 
Green-Pedersen, 2012).  
According to Green-Pedersen (2012, p. 117), politi-
cization is equivalent to saliency, and whether a party 
                                                          
2 This work was supported by the European Commission’s 
Seventh Framework Programme for Research (FP7/2007–
2013) under grant agreement number 225522 (SOM: Support 
and Opposition to Migration). 
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will politicize a certain issue (i.e., raise its salience) is 
dependent on strategic considerations related to party 
competition dynamics. The salience theory of party 
competition states that parties compete by strategical-
ly manipulating the saliency of issues, i.e., by emphasiz-
ing issues that they expect to be beneficial in electoral 
terms while downplaying those likely to cause electoral 
damage (cf., Budge, 1982; Budge & Farlie, 1983; Budge, 
Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, & Tannenbaum, 2001). The 
salience theory suggests that parties “own” different 
issues (cf., Budge, 1982), i.e., certain parties are associ-
ated with certain issues because their previous activi-
ties or their constant focus on these issues (e.g., 
through their parliamentary work, government policy, 
or campaigning) have earned them a reputation and 
credibility. Competing for voters, parties will therefore 
try to emphasize “their own” issues. However, even 
without owning an issue, political parties can empha-
size specific issues in reaction to changes in the politi-
cal environment or because they cannot ignore issues 
strongly emphasized by their competitors. Beyond is-
sue-ownership, a number of other factors determine 
whether politicizing an issue is likely to be beneficial or 
disadvantageous for a party—in particular, whether 
the issue fits a party's ideological profile and whether 
there is congruence between party and voter positions 
with regard to the issue (cf., Hooghe & Marks, 2009; 
Steenbergen & Scott, 2004). 
Over the last few decades, questions related to 
immigration, immigrant integration, and asylum have 
been contested issues in public discourse and subject 
to party conflict. In scholarly literature, public contes-
tation over the issue of immigration is often discussed 
with regard to the success of one specific actor, namely 
the radical right party family. These parties strongly 
mobilize against immigration and are widely viewed as 
the “owners” of the issue (cf., Ivarsflaten, 2008; Mud-
de, 1999; van Spanje & van der Brug, 2007). While 
there is disagreement as to the precise definitions of 
“radical right”, “extreme right”, and “(new) populist 
right”,3 they all share an anti-immigrant rhetoric, 
sometimes combined with ethno-nationalism and, 
more recently, anti-Islamic polemic. The respective 
parties “seek to mobilize support around some form of 
national/regional identity, accompanied by anti-ethnic 
minority sentiments” (Eatwell, 2000, p. 349), turning 
above all against (mostly non-white) immigrants, which 
are often stigmatized as a social burden and cultural 
threat.  
The immigration issue perfectly fits the profile of 
radical right parties, who strive for a homogenous na-
tional identity based on an ethno-centric understand-
ing of community, which they share with their voters. It 
                                                          
3 For a useful summary see Carter (2005, pp. 14-23; cf. also, 
Eatwell, 2000; Kitschelt, 1995; Minkenberg, 2000; Mudde, 
1996; Rydgren, 2007, 2005; Taggart, 1995). 
also provides them with strategic assets on the elec-
toral market, challenging both left and right main-
stream competitors (cf., Alonso & Fonseca, 2012; Bale, 
Green-Pedersen, Krouwel, Luther, & Sitter, 2010), 
whose more moderate positioning is challenged from 
both sides of the political spectrum—the radical right 
anti-immigrants and pro-immigrant libertarian parties. 
Therefore, according to the salience theory of party 
competition, radical right parties supposedly are key 
players in the politicization of immigration: they can be 
expected to put more emphasis on the immigration is-
sue in public discourse than any other party family. 
Beyond emphasizing the issue themselves, radical 
right parties may also have an indirect impact on the 
politicization of immigration. Such indirect effects are 
related to party competition dynamics. First, the ex-
treme positioning of the radical right may provoke 
counter-mobilization by pro-immigrant parties, whose 
party profile is based on libertarian values like toler-
ance, human rights and multiculturalism. Such counter-
mobilization may even extend to non-party actors from 
civil society or the media, who oppose a nationalist 
concept of an ethnically, culturally and religiously ho-
mogenous society. Second, radical right issue-
ownership could force mainstream party competitors 
to engage in competition over the issue themselves: 
Challenged by electoral threats from the radical right, 
mainstream left and right parties—who initially com-
peted on the economic rather than the cultural dimen-
sion of conflict (cf., Lipset & Rokkan, 1967) and whose 
electorate is divided on questions of immigration—will 
no longer be able to suppress the issue. The pressure 
on mainstream parties to get involved in the debate on 
immigration will be dependent on the strength of their 
radical right competitors: claims made by hardly suc-
cessful radical right parties with a small electorate lo-
cated at the fringes of the political spectrum can more 
easily be ignored compared to the stronger and grow-
ing ones, who alienate voters from mainstream parties. 
In both examples, the presence of radical right par-
ties in the party system will boost the salience of the 
immigration issue in public discourse, presumably even 
beyond party actors. 
Though there is a growing number of studies deal-
ing with party representation in media coverage on is-
sues related to immigration (e.g., Helbling, 2014; 
Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, & Passy, 2005; Statham & 
Geddes, 2006), systematic data on the politicization of 
immigration and the role of parties therein are still 
missing. 
Following the literature on party competition and 
considering the potential direct and indirect impacts of 
radical right parties on the politicization of immigration 
in public discourse, we arrive at the following hypothe-
ses: (1) radical right parties are the decisive actors in 
the politicization of immigration showing the largest 
share of claims in the media; (2) countries with rele-
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vant radical right parties will reveal stronger politiciza-
tion (i.e. issue salience) in public discourse compared 
to countries lacking such presence; (3) the stronger 
radical right parties (in terms of electoral success), the 
more politicized the immigration issue. 
So far, we discussed the politicization of immigra-
tion in connection with party politics dynamics, and 
radical right party agency in particular. However, the 
literature also offers alternative explanations, which 
shall be discussed briefly. Scholars have long argued 
that the salience of an issue in public discourse would 
be related to “objective” conditions regarding the soci-
etal phenomenon at stake—in this case: immigration. 
Objective conditions, in this regard, refer to actual 
challenges or threats that immigration presents to so-
ciety and people’s lives. The number of immigrants 
would then be an indication of the potential conflict 
that receiving societies are confronted with: the higher 
the share of immigrants of the total population, the 
greater the (potential) challenge; and the greater the 
challenge, the more issue-politicization. However, 
there is still hardly any empirical evidence for this hy-
pothesis, in particular for explaining variations in issue-
politicization over time (cf., Vliegenthart & Boom-
gaarden, 2007; van der Brug, D’Amato, Berkhout & 
Ruedin, 2015). This illustrates that the immigration is-
sue—and most likely other issues as well—do not 
simply appear on the public agenda as a matter of 
course in response to “objective” challenges or prob-
lems. Rather, issues have to be taken up and empha-
sized by societal and political elites who will be heard 
in public discourse.  
Another potential explanation for the rise and de-
cline of immigration as an issue of public controversy 
points to the role of events (cf., Vliegenthart & Boom-
gaarden, 2007). In the Netherlands, for instance, the 
murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a Muslim fun-
damentalist and second-generation immigrant in 2004 
led to a huge debate on multiculturalism and immi-
grant integration. In 2007, asylum policy became a pri-
ority topic on the public agenda in Austria after a 17-
year-old girl went into hiding and threatened to com-
mit suicide after her family had been deported to Ko-
sovo. Protest activities in Switzerland against the build-
ing of minarets led to an intensified debate on Muslim 
immigrants in 2006. Unlike objective facts such as im-
migration statistics, peaks in the politicization of immi-
gration in certain cases can be traced back to specific 
events that—for various reasons—drew public atten-
tion (Vliegenthart & Boomgaarden, 2007). 
Approaching issue-politicization, like defined above, 
as a process of publicly expressed political contention, 
the role of yet another important actor needs to be 
discussed: the media. As both forum and actor, mass 
media have a twofold function in shaping public dis-
course. As a forum, they distribute news and stories 
reported to the general public; as an actor, the media 
themselves shape such news and stories, first, by de-
ciding what issues and whose claims they include in 
their coverage, and, second, by acting as claimants 
themselves (cf., Page, 1996). Like other arenas of polit-
ical contention, the media arena has its own functional 
logic defining the boundaries of public debate over an 
issue. We will return to this point in more detail in the 
section on data and methods. 
3. The Varying Strength of Radical Right Parties in 
Europe 
The political strength of radical right parties varies con-
siderably in Western European countries. Whilst there 
are no simple answers as to why these differences 
have emerged, scholars highlight the importance of 
supply-side factors in explaining radical right electoral 
success (cf., Carter, 2005; Givens, 2005; Norris, 2005; 
van der Brug, Fennema, & Tillie, 2005).4 
In Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzer-
land, radical right parties representing an overtly na-
tionalist and anti-immigrant approach (cf., Rydgren, 
2005) have gained considerable electoral votes—
though with varying success in the various countries 
and over time—and are thus to be considered relevant 
for party political contestation (cf., Sartori, 1976). In 
contrast, in Spain and the UK no proponent of the radi-
cal right party family has so far passed the electoral 
threshold to be represented in national parliament. 
The radical right Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) had 
its first electoral triumph in the late 1980s, reaching 
the peak in 1999 when it became the second strongest 
party with 26.9 per cent, forming a coalition govern-
ment with the Christian-democrats (ÖVP). Despite an 
intra-party dispute, the collapse of the coalition gov-
ernment, and a sharp decline in the early elections of 
2002, the radical right continued to play a significant 
role in the Austrian party system (Heinisch, 2003). With 
the FPÖ split-off in 2005, another radical right party ac-
tor was represented in parliament, the BZÖ. The BZÖ, 
founded by former FPÖ-figurehead Jörg Haider, gained 
4.1 per cent in the 2006 elections and increased its 
share of the vote to 10.7 per cent in 2008. Together 
with the FPÖ regaining strength, the radical right bloc 
reached 28.1 per cent and 55 out of 183 seats in par-
liament, thus surpassing the FPÖ’s 1999 victory.5 
Whilst it is true that the FPÖ’s (and BZÖ’s) electoral 
success cannot only be attributed to the immigration 
                                                          
4 For a state-of-the-art summary see van der Brug & Fennema 
(2007). 
5 The 2013 election brought significant changes to the Austri-
an party political landscape: while the BZÖ failed to reach the 
4 per cent threshold to be represented in parliament, two 
new parties succeeded, and for the first time six parties are 
represented in parliament. Despite new competitors, the FPÖ 
further increased its share of the vote to 20.5 per cent. 
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issue, the latter definitely played—and still plays—a 
significant role (cf., SORA, 2006). FPÖ electoral cam-
paigning is characterized by reference to the concept 
of Überfremdung (“foreign domination”), the guiding 
principle Österreich zuerst! (“Austria first!”), and (more 
recently) anti-Islamic rhetoric (cf., Gruber, 2014; 
Krzyzanowski, 2013; Rosenberger & Hadj-Abdou, 2013; 
Wodak & Köhler, 2010). 
In Belgium, the success of the radical right parties 
varies greatly in the two regions: whereas the Flemish 
Vlaams Belang (VB, former: Vlaams Blok6) managed to 
increase its share of the vote gradually from 7.8 to 12 
per cent in 2007, the Front National in French-speaking 
Wallonia failed to reach a comparable percentage and 
significance. The unique significance of regional differ-
ences in Belgium defines the political landscape. How-
ever, the Vlaams Belang replaced the striving for inde-
pendence—traditionally the primary objective of 
Flemish nationalist parties—by putting greater empha-
sis on the immigration issue (Minkenberg, 2008). Simi-
lar to the concept of Überfremdung, the Vlaams Bel-
ang’s credo Eigen volk eerst (“our people first”) reflects 
a clear separation between a constructed national (or 
regional) unity and an outside threat, namely immi-
grants. Until today—and in contrast to Austria, the 
Netherlands, and Switzerland—the party is widely iso-
lated within the Belgian political system as a conse-
quence of the cordon sanitaire struck by all other par-
ties (cf., Downs, 2001).  
In the Netherlands, the anti-immigrant Lijst Pim 
Fortuyn gained 17 per cent of the votes and 26 seats in 
parliament in the 2002 elections.7 Despite this short-
lived success, it is considered to have substantially af-
fected politics in the Netherlands, which was previous-
ly characterized by widespread acceptance of the mul-
ticulturalist approach upholding the inclusion and 
tolerance of ethnic, cultural, and religious minorities 
(Minkenberg, 2008). While neither the LPF nor respec-
tive party splits could measure up to the 2002 results, 
the 2006 election brought forth another anti-
immigrant radical right party, namely Geert Wilders’ 
PVV, which managed to win 5.9 per cent, increasing its 
share of the vote to 15.5 per cent in 2010. The PVV 
mainly focusses on anti-Muslim campaigning, justified 
by the explicit support of libertarian attitudes like gay 
rights and emancipation of women.8 
                                                          
6 The party was reestablished under its new name after a 
court decision in 2004 had found the Vlaams Blok guilty of 
racism. 
7 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the nationalist, anti-
immigrant Centre Democrats (CD) were temporarily success-
ful when entering national parliament. Failing to repeat this 
success in the 1999 general election, the party then disap-
peared from the political lanscape.  
8 Between 2010 and 2012 (a period which is not covered by 
our data), the major success of Wilders’ party allowed the 
In terms of continuous electoral success, parlia-
mentary presence, and government participation, the 
Swiss People’s Party (SVP) is the most prosperous right-
wing anti-immigrant party included in our analysis. 
Though not a radical right party in terms of its historical 
origins, we treat the SVP as part of the radical right 
family because of its pronounced ethno-nationalist 
stance and populism, indicated not least by the party’s 
recurring reference to the concept of Überfremdung 
(Skenderovic & D’Amato, 2008; Minkenberg, 2008).9 
Due to the SVP’s electoral achievements and Switzer-
land’s consociational government that includes all ma-
jor parties, Switzerland ranks first among the countries 
observed in terms of radical right strength between 
1995 and 2009: during that period, the SVP kept in-
creasing its share of the vote from 14.9 to 28.9 per 
cent in 2007, and it has been Switzerland’s strongest 
party since the 1999 election.  
In contrast to the aforementioned countries, radical 
right parties are not represented in the national par-
liaments of the United Kingdom and Spain. In the UK, 
the first-past-the-post electoral system clearly privileg-
es mainstream parties, although radical right, anti-
immigrant parties, i.e. the British National Party (BNP) 
and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), 
have been successful at the local and European level in 
recent years.10 Besides withdrawal from the European 
Union, the immigration issue is the most important 
item on the political agenda of these parties, focusing, 
in particular, on economic arguments associated with 
nationalist views (Halikiopoulou & Vasilopoulou, 2010).  
Likewise in Spain, anti-immigrant radical right par-
ties have only been successful at the local level, and 
only in recent times (cf., Ros & Morales, 2012). One 
reason for their poor performance, scholars argue, is 
their failure to dissociate themselves from associations 
with ideologies of the Franco regime (Norris, 2005). 
Another aspect stressed in the literature is the main-
stream right Popular Party’s (PP) success in attracting 
far-right voters (cf., Ros & Morales, 2012). 
Having briefly described the radical right parties in 
the six countries included in our research, we sum up 
the common features and differences of the parties 
and countries respectively: four countries have strong 
radical right parties, with varying electoral success. 
Switzerland and Austria rank first with an average of 23 
                                                                                           
formation of a minority government under the conservative 
Christen Democratisch Appèl leadership and the connivance 
of the PVV (Wilp, 2012). 
9 The SVP is said to be close to conservative and radical right 
parties due to its strong roots in national conservatism and 
its vigorous populist anti-immigrant stance since the early 
1990s (Statham & Koopmans, 2009, p. 443). 
10 The British National Front was successful at local elections 
only during the 1970s and has since then practically lost its 
political significance. 
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per cent and 20 per cent of the seats respectively be-
tween 1995 and 2009, followed by Belgium (12 per 
cent) and the Netherlands (4 per cent) (see Table 1). 
While some radical right parties have gradually in-
creased their power (SVP, VB), others like the FPÖ, 
BZÖ, LPF and PVV have failed to continue their devel-
opment, which is mainly due to internal crises. Three of 
these parties joined national governments as coalition 
partners, namely the Swiss SVP, the Austrian FPÖ/BZÖ 
and the Dutch LPF.11 Whilst not all of the parties men-
tioned in this section fit the radical right label, all of 
them, including the less important British and Spanish 
parties, share a pronounced anti-immigrant ideology 
and can thus be expected to play a significant role in 
the politicization of immigration. 





























Notes: RR parties: radical right parties present in country; 
RR share of seats: radical right parties’ share of seats in 
national parliament in the period 1995–2009 for each leg-
islative period (number of elections varies from country to 
country); RR gov-part: radical right party representation in 
national government. *Consociational government in-
cluding all major Swiss parties. 
4. Data and Methods 
This paper approaches the matter of issue-
politicization of immigration in the public sphere with a 
particular focus on party actors, especially radical right 
parties. The analysis is confined to six Western Europe-
an countries between 1995 and 2009: Austria, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom. The time frame and country selection are 
based on requirements for over-time and cross-country 
variation regarding (expected) issue salience, radical 
right party strength, and immigration patterns (cf., van 
der Brug et al., 2015). Data were collected as part of 
the FP7 project SOM (Support and Opposition to Mi-
                                                          
11 Though Geert Wilders’ PVV supported a minority govern-
ment of the liberal-conservative VVD and the Christian-
democratic CDA between 2010 and 2012, the PVV was not 
part of the cabinet. 
gration), a comparative project investigating the role of 
different actor types in the politicization of immigra-
tion by means of a claims-analysis of media data. As 
argued by de Wilde (2011, p. 562), “whether an issue is 
politicized or not and deemed important by the elec-
torate can indirectly be assessed by studying the extent 
to which it is publicly debated”. Media data are in-
creasingly used to studying public contestation and 
mobilization over issues (e.g., Koopmans et al., 2005; 
Koopmans, 2007). They reflect the publicly visible ex-
pression of claims on an issue raised by a broad range 
of societal actors. This is quite important, as a focus on 
politicization differs from studying party conflict. The 
latter refers to different positions parties may hold on 
an issue—whether or not they find expression in public 
discourse or remain latent. Issue-politicization also 
considers the possibility that non-party actors—
including the media themselves—play a crucial role in 
raising the saliency of an issue, for which these actors 
have to be included in the analysis. Neither party mani-
festos nor data from parliamentary activity meet these 
requirements.  
However, using media data also implies certain lim-
itations resulting from the media’s function as gate-
keeper to public discourse: It is journalists and editors 
deciding what stories and which actors to include in 
media coverage, and what framing to apply to a certain 
event or issue. Therefore, media coverage may not 
represent a balanced picture of different actors’ efforts 
to engage in the politicization of an issue. In particular, 
there is strong evidence in communication studies 
“that government officials serve as the chief sources of 
many kinds of political news” (Page, 1996, p. 22). Con-
sequently, governing actors seem to dominate claims-
making on politically relevant issues in the media (e.g., 
Koopmans et al., 2005; Koopmans, 2007), since their 
claims are viewed either as more newsworthy or relia-
ble, or because government actors have better access 
to journalists and editors. Analysing various actors’ en-
gagement in the politicization of an issue, we thus have 
to keep in mind that some actors—and governing ac-
tors in particular—may have privileged access to the 
media because of their political or economic power or 
their prominence. 
Conversely, other actors may suffer from more ex-
plicit exclusionary dynamics resulting from broad polit-
ical and public consensus challenging the legitimacy of 
these actors’ claims. Recall the cordon sanitaire in Bel-
gium, which could result in an underrepresentation of 
the radical right’s claims in the news, if media actors 
comply with this elite consensus. On the other hand, 
radical right parties’ extreme positioning yields great 
potential for political conflict, raising the newsworthi-
ness of these actors’ claims. This also applies to cases 
with charismatic party leaders, as for instance the Aus-
trian Freedom Party’s Jörg Haider or the Swiss People’s 
Party Christoph Blocher in the 1990s, whose unambig-
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uous populism made for better stories than sophisti-
cated policy programs presented by some political 
competitors. Finally, the more established radical right 
parties become in the party system (indicated e.g., by 
their share of seats in parliament or participation in 
government), the less likely they will be considered 
negligible actors by the media. In conclusion, there is 
no reason why one should expect the media in general 
not to cover claims of the radical right. If anything, rad-
ical right parties must make their claims and actions 
visible in public in order to achieve the status as “own-
ers” of the immigration issue. 
Applying claims-analysis, a total of 6586 claims 
were coded from newspaper articles for the six coun-
tries, taking two to four papers from each country.12 
Political claims-analysis is a method developed by so-
cial movement scholars which is increasingly used for 
examining mobilization strategies of politically relevant 
actors (cf., Koopmans et al., 2005; Koopmans & Stat-
ham, 2000). An instance of claims-making (henceforth: 
a claim) is defined as a unit of strategic physical or ver-
bal action in the public sphere that entails a “purposive 
and public articulation of political demands, calls to ac-
tion, proposals, criticisms, or physical attacks, which 
actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity 
of the claimants and/or other collective actors” 
(Koopmans et al., 2005, p. 24, emphasis in the original). 
Political claims comprise various elements, including a 
claimant, a topic or political demand, an addressee as 
well as a potentially affected object actor (Berkhout & 
Sudulich, 2011)13. In this paper we focus on the claim-
ant (i.e., the actor making the claim) and—in case of 
party actors—party affiliation14. In total, we distin-
                                                          
12 The selected newspapers are: Der Standard, Neue Kronen 
Zeitung (AT); De Standaard/Le Soir, Het Laatste Nieuws/La 
Dernière Heure (BE); The Irish Times, Irish Daily Star (EI); 
Volkskrant, Telegraaf (NL); El País, La Vanguardia (ES); Neue 
Zürcher Zeitung/Le Temps/Tribune de Genève, Blick/Le Matin 
(CH); The Guardian, Daily Mail (UK). In Belgium and Switzer-
land two additional newspapers were included to account for 
differences between the Dutch and French and the German 
and French language regions respectively. In Switzerland, the 
Tribune de Genève is treated as the predecessor of Le Temps; 
as regards the Spanish paper La Vanguardia the term tabloid 
does not have the same meaning as in the other countries. 
For more details on newspaper selections see van der Brug et 
al. (2015). 
13 The SOM Codebook comprises additional categories, in-
spired by Codebooks of similar projects, including MERCI 
(Koopmans et al., 2005), EUROPUB (Koopmans, 2002) and 
LOCALMULTIDEM (Cinalli & Giuigni, 2007). The coding of arti-
cles was conducted centrally at the Universiteit van Amster-
dam under the direction of Wouter van der Brug. 
14 Party affiliation was coded for established actors, i.e., gov-
guished between six different categories of party fami-
lies which claims-making party actors have been as-
signed to (cf., Statham & Koopmans, 2009, p. 443): the 
radical right, liberals, conservatives (including Chris-
tian-democrats), social democrats, the greens, and fi-
nally the radical left.15 We approach issue-politicization 
as a matter of salience or issue emphasis, which we 
measure as follows: (1) We measure individual parties’ 
engagement in the politicization of immigration as the 
relative proportion of claims raised by a particular ac-
tor on all claims or all claims of a particular actor type 
(namely: political parties). (2) Salience at the country 
level will be measured as the number of claims relative 
to the size of the sample, which varies both between 
countries and years (see below).  
Apart from issue salience, we will also look at the 
direction of claims, which provides an indication for ac-
tors’ positioning in the politicization of immigration. 
The SOM Codebook includes a position variable with 
five values, distinguishing claims that are (1) strongly or 
(2) slightly open to migrants or cosmopolitan or multi-
cultural in their focus, or conversely (3) strongly or (4) 
slightly restrictive to migrants, pro-national residents 
or mono-cultural in their focus, and (5) neutral claims 
with a technocratic or ambivalent orientation that has 
no clear-cut direction.16  
Figure 1 presents an overview of the total number 
of claims coded per newspaper and country. For each 
newspaper, articles relating to issues of immigration, 
migrant integration and asylum were manually select-
ed by country teams for a random sample of 375 days 
between 1995 and 2009.17 18 Unsurprisingly, we find an 
uneven distribution of claims reported by different 
media outlets, with lower numbers in tabloids com-
pared to the quality press, the coverage of which is 
more claims-focussed as might be expected. 
                                                                                           
ernment actors, national parliament and legislative assem-
blies at the regional level as well as representatives of politi-
cal parties. This allows for an analysis of the overall presence 
as well as the positions of the respective parties. 
15 All other parties are coded in a seventh category (“oth-
ers”). 
16 Further details can be found in the Codebook (Berkhout & 
Sudulich, 2011). 
17 The period lasted exactly from January 1, 1995 to Decem-
ber 31, 2009, excluding Sundays. 
18 There is an overlap of 50 days between both newspaper 
samples, while there are differences on 325 days. The exact 
amount of sampled days for each country are: AT 750, BE 
1216, CH 859, ES 753, NL 757, and UK 751. The larger sam-
ples in BE and CH are due to the selection of additional 
newspapers to cover different language regions. 
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Figure 1. Number of claims on immigration per country (1995–2009). 
5. Findings: Low Salience but Extreme Positioning  
This section presents our empirical findings regarding 
the role of radical right parties in the politicization of 
immigration in the public arena. We will first look at 
claims-making on immigration by individual actors—in 
particular the radical right party family—before turning 
to (temporal) patterns in the overall salience of immi-
gration in a given country.  
Following the literature, we hypothesized that radi-
cal right parties are key players in the politicization of 
immigration, which should be reflected in a compara-
tively large share of claims. As illustrated by Figure 2, 
the share of claims raised by radical right parties is 
quite small in all six countries. In total only 4.4 per cent 
of all claims originate from this particular actor group. 
Though these figures are indeed low, we need to 
compare them with the number of claims of other ac-
tors in order to come to a meaningful interpretation. It 
could well be that other non-party actors like civil soci-
ety organizations or the media dominate the politiciza-
tion of immigration. In this case the share of radical 
right party claims—though small in absolute terms—
would be much higher when compared to other par-
ties. Therefore we check next whether the debate is 
driven by party actors at all. Table 2 shows the top 
three actors in our six countries. As we can see, gov-
ernment and party actors are indeed crucial. Except for 
the UK (where the media is most important) and Bel-
gium (where civil society ranks comparatively high), 
government and party actors are the two most im-
portant actor types. It is important to note that the 
category of governmental actors may as well include 
party actors, as in the case of ministers or the like, who 
do not only speak as representatives of government, 
but also as prominent members of their parties. 
Next we take a closer look at claims-making by par-
ty actors, for which we compare party families, as 
shown in Figure 3. Surprisingly, radical right parties are 
not the main claimants when compared only to other 
party actors. In this regard, the Swiss case represents 
an exception, with the highest share of claims raised by 
the SVP (38.8 per cent). In all the other countries, we 
observe that radical right parties play a subordinate 
role. This does not come as a surprise in the cases of 
Spain and the UK, where these parties were hardly suc-
cessful at the ballot box and failed to be represented in 
parliament. In Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands, 
however, one might have expected a larger share of 
radical right party claims. As a matter of fact, main-
stream parties from both the left and the right (i.e. so-
cial democrats, liberals, and conservatives) outperform 
radical right parties in claims-making on immigration.  
These findings clearly reject our first hypothesis ac-
cording to which radical right parties should have a di-
rect impact as key players in the politicization of immi-
gration. In contrast to party family, they suggest that the 
role political parties play in the politicization of immigra-
tion might be a question of party size or government 
participation. This would also explain the Swiss SVP’s 
comparatively high share of claims, since the party be-
came the strongest party in the Swiss party system in 
1999 and is part of the Swiss consociational government. 
So far our findings suggest that radical right parties 
play a subordinate role in the politicization of immigra-
tion given their limited contribution to the saliency of 
the issue in the media. Turning our attention to the di-
rection of claims in issue-politicization, the picture 
might be a different one. Focusing on the mean posi-
tioning on a scale from -1 (negative towards immigra-
 Politics and Governance, 2015, Volume 3, Issue 2, Pages 1-17 9 
tion/migrant integration/asylum-seekers) to 1 (positive), 
our findings generally reveal that the debate is slightly 
biased towards a more liberal orientation (see Table 3). 
Interestingly, the exception is the United Kingdom, 
where radical right parties are neither represented in 
parliament nor do they contribute significantly to the 
politicization of immigration through claims in the me-
dia. Turning to party actors (i.e., excluding claims from 
all other actor types like civil society, the media etc.), the 
debate turns more negative in all countries. However, 
the radical right parties make the most negative claims 
on immigration. Therefore, they stand out with their 
negative positions despite their subordinate role regard-
ing issue salience, and thus clearly contribute to the po-
larization of the debate on immigration. 
 
Figure 2. Issue salience per country (1995–2009). Notes: Issue salience is the average number of claims per number of 
sampling days. 
Table 2. Top three actors in politicization (1995–2009). 
 Actor 1 Actor 2 Actor 3 
AT Gov (38.4) Party (27.4) CS (9.4) 
BE Gov (28.7) CS (23.8) Party (19.8) 
CH Gov (26.8) Party (24.5) CS (13.1) 
NL Gov (34.1) Party (19.9) Exp (9.4) 
ES Gov (45.0) Party (13.6) CS (10.0) 
UK Media (31.1) Gov (22.6) Party (10.3) 
Notes: Gov: government; CS: civil society; Exp: Experts. Share of claims in parentheses. N = 6585. 
 
Figure 3. Share of claims per country by party family (1995–2009). 
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Table 3. Average positioning according to actor type. 
 All Parties RR 
AT 0.19 (0.68) n = 913 0.04 (0.69) n = 511 -0.74 (0.43) n = 109 
BE 0.25 (0.69) n = 973 0.01 (0.70) n = 249 -1.00 (0.00) n = 19 
CH 0.20 (0.65) n = 821 -0.09 (0.66) n = 220 -0.54 (0.50) n = 85 
ES 0.15 (0.67) n = 1019 0.07 (0.56) n = 233 -- -- -- 
NL 0.14 (0.55) n = 1191 0.01 (0.58) n = 498 -0.53 (0.60) n = 34 
UK -0.07 (0.84) n = 612 -0.36 (0.78) n = 154 -1.00 (0.00) n = 7 
Note: Positioning is measured on a 5-point scale between negative (-1) and positive (1) towards immigration/migrant 
integration/asylum-seekers. Standard deviation in parentheses. 
Even if radical right parties do not have a direct impact 
on the politicization of immigration as expected, they 
may still have an important indirect effect, for which 
their extreme positioning might be a first indication 
(see Section 2). An indirect effect is unfortunately more 
difficult to assess using our data. Still, our cross-
country and longitudinal design at least enables us to 
compare radical right presence/strength with patterns 
in the politicization of immigration, which will provide 
some indication for a potential indirect impact of radi-
cal right parties.  
Our second hypothesis stated that the salience of 
the immigration issue should be higher in countries 
with politically relevant radical right parties (indicated 
by representation in national parliament). This is due 
to (a) counter-mobilization by pro-immigrant actors in 
response to the radical right's extreme positioning, 
and (b) more issue-emphasis by mainstream parties 
suffering electoral threats by successful radical right 
competitors.  
Different levels of issue salience across countries 
can, of course, also be affected by factors related to 
the media system and differences in reporting styles 
between countries and outlets. So we have to be very 
cautious not to overestimate the contribution of radi-
cal right parties to differences in the various countries. 
Still, such comparison provides a first tentative insight 
into potential indirect impacts of radical right parties 
on the politicization of immigration. 
Clustering our six countries in two groups—with 
and without relevant radical right parties—we would 
expect Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzer-
land to reveal higher degrees of issue salience com-
pared to Spain and the UK as there are no serious radi-
cal right competitors in the party system of the latter 
two. As reflected in the average salience measure for 
each country, however, this is not what we find (see 
Figure 2). Considering the whole 15-year-period, Spain 
(1.38) and the UK (1.21) outperform both Switzerland 
and Belgium despite the former two’s absence of radi-
cal right parties in national parliament.  
Turning from radical right presence to strength, we 
hypothesized a positive relation between radical right 
strength and issue salience. We explore this potential 
relation in two steps. First, we compare the predicted 
order of countries according to radical right strength 
against country-averages on issue salience: considering 
the whole time frame, we would expect Switzerland 
and Austria to reveal the most intense debates on im-
migration, reflected in the highest shares of issue sali-
ence. Both countries yield considerable—and (tempo-
rarily) increasing—radical right presence in parliament. 
Contrariwise, Spain and the UK should display compar-
atively low levels of issue salience, whereas Belgium 
and the Netherlands should rank in between. As shown 
in Figure 2, this is not what we find. The Netherlands 
show the highest proportion of claims (1.83) by far. 
However, this is not least due to the outlier in 2004, 
when the yearly averages strongly—and temporarily—
increased as the issue became highly salient around 
the time of the murder of film-maker Theo van Gogh 
(cf., Berkhout, Sudulich, & van der Brug, 2015). As ex-
pected, Austria shows comparatively high levels of sali-
ence (1.4), whereas Switzerland only ranks second to 
last (1.18) notwithstanding the strength and continu-
ous growth of the SVP in the Swiss party system. Spain 
(1.38) and the UK (1.21) outperform both Switzerland 
and Belgium despite the former two’s absence of radi-
cal right parties in national parliament. 
Second, we focus on temporal trends within coun-
tries. Over-time variation should be particularly pro-
nounced in the Netherlands, Austria, and Switzerland: 
issue salience should have strongly increased in the 
Netherlands in 2002, it was assumed to decrease in 
Austria in 2003 before rising again in 2009, and it 
should have steadily increased in Switzerland (see Ta-
ble 1). Figures 4–9 show patterns in issue salience, 
share of radical right claims (grey and black bars, left 
vertical axis) and radical right party strength (black line, 
right vertical axis) per country.  
Austria had three peaks in issue salience—in 2001, 
2007, and 2009—, showing at least some correspond-
ence to temporal patterns in radical right strength, 
though not always simultaneously. Until 2007, Belgian 
radical right parties steadily gained strength in parlia-
ment. Issue salience, on the other hand, reflects more 
fluctuation—sometimes in the opposite direction—
than one might expect: Issue salience decreased in 
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1999 and 2003 although the radical right strengthened 
its presence in parliament. In Switzerland, changes in 
salience values correspond to increasing radical right 
party strength only in 2007, whereas salience de-
creases although the SVP’s share of seats increased in 
1999 and 2003; the 1998 peak in salience precedes 
the SVP’s electoral victory in 1999, while the opposite 
happened in 2003/2004. The Netherlands are charac-
terized by two peaks: The electoral success of the LPF 
in 2002—corresponding to a small increase in issue 
salience—and the salience outlier in 2004 related to 
the murder of film-maker van Gogh. Excluding the lat-
ter, however, there is no evidence for an increase in 
issue salience from 2002 onwards compared to the 
prior period, when radical right parties did not have 
any electoral success and hence no parliamentary 
presence. Since there are no radical right parties in ei-
ther the Spanish or British parliaments, temporal pat-
terns in issue salience cannot be related to the 
strength of this party family at all. 
 
Figure 4. Austria. 
 
Figure 5. Belgium. 
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Figure 6. Switzerland. 
 
Figure 7. The Netherlands. 
 
Figure 8. Spain. 
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Figure 9. United Kingdom. 
Figures 4–9. Issue salience and radical right (rr) party strength over time. 
The longitudinal analysis within countries again reveals 
no systematic pattern confirming the hypothesized re-
lation between strength of radical right parties and the 
salience of the immigration issue: for instance, the 
number of claims has not grown considerably in Swit-
zerland despite the SVP having steadily increased its 
power. Likewise, the Netherlands and Spain display 
considerable peaks that are not related to the perfor-
mance of radical parties; and the Austrian pattern does 
not allow for a straightforward conclusion either, as sa-
lience figures increase and decrease with no clear-cut 
correspondence to radical right parties’ electoral or 
parliamentary strength.  
All in all, issue salience in a given country thus seems 
to be unrelated to radical right party presence and 
strength. A comparison of Spain, the UK and Switzerland 
clearly reveals that neither the absence of relevant radi-
cal right parties (Spain and UK) nor their strength in the 
party system (Switzerland) are reflected by the degree of 
politicization of immigration in a given country. 
In summary, our findings clearly show that radical 
right parties are not the dominant actors in the politici-
zation of immigration. It is, above all, the governing ac-
tors and mainstream parties who emphasize the issue. 
Neither does radical right presence/strength seem to 
have an impact on total issue salience and temporal 
trends therein. This, however, does not preclude that 
radical right parties have an important indirect effect 
on their competitors' strategies. The large number of 
claims by governing and other party actors may indeed 
be a response to electoral pressure from the radical 
right. Bearing this in mind, the fact that Spain and the 
UK reveal a slightly different composition of actors in 
the politicization of immigration compared to the other 
countries calls for a more detailed analysis of the po-
tential indirect radical right impact—a point to which 
we will return in the conclusion of this paper. 
6. Conclusion and Outlook  
As indicated in scholarly work on radical right parties in 
Europe, this paper was based on the assumption that 
this party family would play a key role in the politiciza-
tion of immigration in the media. In line with the sali-
ence theory of party competition, it was assumed that 
radical parties—who are considered the “owners” of 
the immigration issue—would be most active in claims-
making on immigration compared to other party fami-
lies. We also assumed that their strong position within 
the party system would be reflected in the issue-
politicization of immigration in a given country: coun-
tries with a strong radical right party presence were 
expected to reflect higher levels of issue-politicization 
compared to countries lacking such presence; further-
more, the stronger the radical right, the higher the de-
gree of issue-politicization. The reason for this is that 
other parties can be expected to pick up on issues of 
their competitors depending on the competitor’s 
strength in the party system. We explored these hy-
potheses empirically using data from the SOM claims 
analysis in six Western European countries reflecting 
variation in the presence and strength of radical right 
parties, covering a period of 15 years (1995–2009).  
In contrast to our expectations, our findings indi-
cate that radical right parties play a subordinate role in 
the politicization of immigration. First, radical right par-
ties are not the drivers of the politicization of immigra-
tion in the media. Both mainstream left and right par-
ties reveal higher shares of claims on immigration than 
their radical right competitors. The exception is the 
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Swiss SVP, which turns out to be the main claimant on 
immigration issues in Switzerland. Second, overall issue 
salience does not seem to be related to either radical 
right party presence or strength. Cross-country com-
parison reveals higher degrees of issue salience than 
expected for the UK and Spain (despite no relevant 
radical right parties), whereas Switzerland does not 
come up to our expectations. Temporal trends in issue 
salience do not support the hypothesis either: Peaks in 
issue salience do not follow a clear-cut pattern in line 
with radical right parties’ strength (indicated by elec-
toral success and the share of seats in parliament).  
According to our data and analytical approach, rad-
ical right parties seem to be much less important in the 
politicization of immigration than assumed in general. 
This finding yields some important questions. First, why 
are mainstream parties so dominant in the politiciza-
tion of immigration, while radical right parties are not? 
Second, what other reasons serve to explain trends in 
the politicization of immigration? While it goes beyond 
the scope of this paper to systematically test alterna-
tive explanations for issue-politicization of immigra-
tion, we will briefly address these questions in the re-
mainder of this paper. 
The dominant role played by mainstream parties in 
the politicization of immigration strongly questions the 
importance of party family, ideology, and issue-
ownership as determinants of party issue-politicization, 
since these factors made us expect radical right parties 
to be much more important. Rather, it points to party 
strength and government participation as promising 
explanatory factors. The Swiss case illustrates this very 
well: only the SVP turns out to be the party with the 
highest share of claims, whereas their radical right coun-
terparts in the other countries unexpectedly lag behind 
their mainstream competitors. However, the SVP is a 
special case with regard to various aspects. Whilst it is a 
right-wing anti-immigrant party, it is not a radical right 
party in terms of its historical origins. Furthermore, due 
to Switzerland's specific governing system, the SVP was 
constantly represented in Swiss consociational govern-
ment during our period of investigation. Finally, the SVP 
has become the largest party in Switzerland since the 
1999 elections. Therefore, the findings for the SVP may 
be associated to a lesser extent to party family but ra-
ther more to party size and governing authority. 
As mentioned above, media coverage may not rep-
resent a balanced picture of different actors’ claims-
making efforts. Though there is no reason to believe 
that claims by the radical right will generally be exclud-
ed from coverage, a number of studies (e.g., Koopmans 
et al., 2005; Koopmans, 2007) have shown that gov-
ernment actors generally seem to dominate claims-
making in the media, since their claims are viewed as 
either more newsworthy or reliable, or because gov-
ernment actors have better access to news coverage. 
Thus the high share of mainstream parties’ claims on 
immigration may be related to their status as govern-
ing parties in some cases. However, we did not find 
systematic evidence for an increase in radical right par-
ties' claims once these actors became part of a national 
government. Still, we cannot preclude with certainty 
that non-governing radical right parties may be un-
derrepresented in claims-making as reported in the 
media. Future research should concentrate on a com-
parison of different data types on political parties’ at-
tempts to politicize the immigration issue, comparing 
e.g., issue-emphasis in press releases with media data, 
or parliamentary activities with party campaigning.19 
This would be a fruitful way to overcome the potential 
bias in media data regarding an adequate representation 
of non-governing parties’ efforts to politicize an issue. 
Our research design did not allow for such an approach.  
Even though radical right party strength did not 
emerge as a good predictor for the salience of issue-
politicization on immigration, mainstream parties' large 
share of claims could still be a reaction to electoral 
pressure from the radical right. Assessing this potential 
indirect impact of the radical right in more detail, how-
ever, requires a different research strategy and goes 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
Another interesting question is whether there is any 
reason to believe that radical right parties actually make 
fewer claims on an issue than their competitors. Why 
would that be the case? Immigration may primarily be 
addressed by them focusing on a problem definition 
(“too many foreigners”) rather than a political solution 
(“we demand x or y in order to overcome the problem”). 
This would be in line with their simplistic policy program 
and often populist strategies of mobilization. In that 
case, claims-making would be a bad indicator for issue-
politicization in respect of this particular actor. However, 
the operational definition of claims applied in our re-
search was very broad and did not only cover political 
solutions, which is why we are quite sure that radical 
right parties had the same chances as other parties to 
have their messages conveyed. Still, future studies may 
explicitly address this matter, e.g., systematically distin-
guishing between problem definition and claims for po-
litical solutions articulated by political parties.  
Turning our focus to alternative explanations for the 
overall degree of issue-politicization on immigration at 
the country level, and temporal trends therein, two ap-
proaches are repeatedly discussed in the literature: first, 
objective conditions concerning immigration to a coun-
try, and, second, the role that events play. Objective 
conditions, such as immigration numbers and the com-
position of immigrant populations, were studied in detail 
within the larger framework of the SOM project. While 
the findings showed that the issue was not politicized in 
                                                          
19 See e.g., Vliegenhart & Roggenband (2007), who compare 
the salience and framing of immigration/integration in the 
Dutch press and parliament. 
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the absence of noticeable immigration numbers, tem-
poral trends in the salience of the issue were unrelated 
to immigration flows (cf., van der Brug et al., 2015; see 
also Vliegenthart, & Boomgaarden, 2007). It is more dif-
ficult with regard to the role events play, which seems to 
be an important aspect when it comes to explaining cer-
tain peaks in politicization (Vliegenthart, & Boom-
gaarden, 2007). Still, further research is needed if we 
seek to understand why certain events turn out as trig-
gers for politicization while others don't.  
Recent contributions to the study of radical or ex-
treme right anti-immigrant parties indicate that the lat-
ter’s impact on politics may be overestimated (cf., Ak-
kerman, 2012; Alonso & Fonseca, 2012).20 Our findings 
support this assessment. Despite some serious limita-
tions discussed above, our study clearly revealed that 
anti-immigrant radical right parties were sparsely rep-
resented in claims-making on immigration in the media 
in the period 1995–2009; an exception is the Swiss SVP. 
Their unique contribution to the politicization of immi-
gration rather seems to be their extreme positioning, 
which may also function as a driver of other parties’ at-
tempts to address the issue. In conclusion, while schol-
arly literature on the emergence and success of radical 
right parties is extensive, more comparative research 
should be devoted to their precise role in influencing 
the political and, in particular, the mass media agenda. 
We have not got any satisfactory answers to this ques-
tion as yet. 
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